ABSTRACT Recent literature has explored both physical and policy linkage between trade and environment. Here we explore linkage through leverage in bargaining, whereby developed countries can use trade policy threats to achieve improved developing country environmental management, while developing countries can use environmental concessions to achieve trade disciplines in developed countries. We use a global numerical simulation model to compute bargaining outcomes from linked trade and environment negotiations, comparing developeddeveloping country bargaining only on trade policy with joint bargaining on both trade and domestic environmental policies. Results indicate joint gains from expanding the trade bargaining set to include environment, opposite to the current developing country reluctance to negotiate in the World Trade Organization on this issue. However, compared to bargaining with cash side payments, linking trade and environment through negotiation on policy instruments provides signi cantly inferior developing country outcomes. Thus, a trade and environment policy-linked negotiation may bebetter than an environment-only negotiation, but negotiating compensation to developing countries for environmental restraint would be better. We provide sensitivity and further analysis of our results and indicate what other factors could qualify our main nding, including the erosion of the MFN principle involved with environmentally based trade actions.
In this paper we discuss possible developing country participation in possible future linked trade and environment negotiations in the World Trade Organization WTO, which w e suggest would largely break down on North-South lines. The South we see as the custodian of yet to be used environmental assets forests and the North as having a high existence value on these assets due to higher income.
Whether or not environmental justi cations for the use of trade restricting policies should be part of any future post Uruguay Round trade negotiations is now a central issue. Developed countries, responding to pressures from their own environmental non-government organizations, have supported their inclusion, while developing countries have appeared more reluctant to engage in a linked negotiation; they instead seek direct compensation for implementing growth slowing environment protecting policies.
Here, we argue that global and also cross-border environmental externalities provide developing countries with strategic leverage over the use of trade restrictions by developed countries against their own exports. Although GATT-WTO tari barriers in OECD countries are now low, sectoral barriers in textiles, apparel, footwear, steel and other areas are still signi cant, as are voluntary export restraints, regulatory restrictions in services, and the use of anti-dumping and countervailing-duty measures.
Linking environmental and trade negotiations thus gives developing countries opportunities to restrain adverse trade policy in developed countries, with environmental concessions being available to bargain for lower trade barriers to their exports. Linkage expands the bargaining set, o ering more opportunity to exchange concessions, which can result in more trade and lowered barriers. Seemingly, linked trade and environment negotiations should be embraced by both the developing and developed world as expanding the choice set for bargaining, leaving the question remaining as to why developing countries are opposed.
To explore these issues, we use a two-region North-South numerical simulation model of world trade and environment benchmarked to 1990 data and projected over a 100-year time horizon. We compute non-cooperative Nash equilibria disagreement outcomes for bargaining, and bargaining outcomes Nash bargaining under both sole and joint bargaining involving trade and the environment. The trade side of the model is a conventional heterogeneous products Armington model, in which trade elasticities play a k ey role. The environmental structure of the model involves environmental assets in the South which are depleted more rapidly when used in trade-related pro-duction activities, and whose existence value enters North's preferences considerably more strongly than is the case for Southern preferences. The calibration of the model involves some strong assumptions and adjustments of data for model admissibility, but generates a speci cation with sharply asymmetric North-South endowments and preference weightings on environmental asset depletion.
The central case results we generate show that, relative to free trade, the South as the smaller region loses in a trade war. A trade-only negotiation helps both the North and South in lowering trade barriers, but a trade-only negotiation with no side payments leaves large barriers remaining in the North against the South. An environment-only negotiation is largely ine ective|because of the strongly asymmetric pattern of abatement costs and bene ts|but a joint trade and environment negotiation allows the North to generate welfare gains from Southern environmental management and the South to lower Northern trade barriers. The theme is that developing countries should embrace a trade and environment negotiation as it provides them with more leverage over trade. However, in a negotiation with side payments the South does considerably better than in a constrained negotiation, suggesting that a trade policy-environmental policy negotiation may bean inferior negotiation; that is, a negotiation of cash compensation for environmental restraint is better for them.
In our concluding section, we also note that trade rule constrained bargaining in which existing trade rules such as MFN are taken to imply restrictions on the bargaining set may yield a di erent picture. If we consider trade and environment linkage as a proposal under which MFN trade rules would also be relaxed where environmental e ects are at issue, and if an initial weakening of MFN could lead to further system-wide weakening in other areas, developing country concerns over a trade and environment negotiation may bemore rmly based. In such cases, gains from expanded bargaining could be more than o set by losses from the weakening of prior agreed restraints on trade policy.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we outline our analysis and contrast it with that in earlier studies on linkages between trade and environment.
Section 3 describes the structure of the model, while Section 4 describes the data and methodology used for calibration. Section 5 describes our experiments and presents our ndings. Section 6 concludes.
Trade and Environment Linkage
The literature on linkage between international trade and environmental quality has primarily focused on two related questions: whether international trade contributes to lowered environmental quality e.g. Anderson, 1992a; Anderson, 1992b; Dean, 1992; Rauscher, 1992;  and whether trade liberalization is desirable, both in terms of global e ciency and individual-country interest, when environmental emissions are not internalized e.g. Dean, 1992; Pearce, 1992 . The policy debate on trade and environment has also often been interpreted as re ecting concerns over these forms of linkage.
In this literature there is a presumption that linkage between trade and environmental policies is weak and that trade policies are ine ective instruments of environmental protection|a conjecture con rmed by model-based estimates of trade-environment linkage Perroni and Wigle, 1994 . As Blackhurst and Subramanian 1992 have pointed out, there are also strategic reasons for linking trade and environmental policies in multilateral negotiations. This complementarity b e t w een trade and environmental policies, which stems from the asymmetric structure and distribution of the gains and losses across high and low income countries associated with each of these two policy dimensions, can also make global cooperation easier to sustain when pursued through linked negotiations.
The strategic linkage between trade policy and the environment discussed here does not seem to have been directly addressed in the literature. Barrett 1994 and Ulph 1996a , 1996b , among others, have studied the interaction between trade and environmental policies theoretically, but de ne the strategic element from the standpoint of the market structure in which rms operate. Copeland and Taylor 1995 have examined the interaction between trade, cross-border externalities and income levels in a general equilibrium model when countries di er in human capital and income and when they are similar. They nd that when countries di er in human capital and income levels, trade liberalization increases pollution and leaves the higher-income, capital-abundant countries worse o . They raise a possible link between North-South trade and environmental policies, but do not explore it in detail, and throughout their analysis trade policies are exogenous.
Papers that are related to the analysis we present here are Cesar and Zeeuw 1994 , Spagnolo 1996 , Ludema and Wooton 1994 and Nordhaus and Yang 1996 The rst of these builds a general framework linking environmental cooperation with cooperation in some other, non-speci ed area. They show that cooperation in both areas is sustainable provided that the two games roughly o set each other. That is, Ludema and Wooton use a partial equilibrium model to examine a noncooperative game between two countries in the presence of a cross-border externality. They show that countries would tend to use environmental policy as a substitute for trade policy and viceversa, and that there will generally beatendency for the externality to beovercorrected. They do not explore the possibility o f environmental policy cooperation, although they point out a linkage between trade and environment could be implicitly present in some free trade agreements involving countries of di erent size which contain some environmental provisions. This leads the larger country to give up its monopoly power to the smaller one as a form of side payment for agreeing to environmental cooperation. Strategic linkages between trade and environmental policies are not examined empirically.
Finally, Nordhaus and Yang use a multi-region dynamic general-equilibrium model to examine market, cooperative and noncooperative enviromental strategies.
They compute noncoperative Nash equilibria in environmental policies as well as cooperative equilibria where countries adopt globally e cient policies to reduce emissions. One of their ndings is that the noncooperative strategy is superior to the do-nothing market strategy but inferior to cooperative policies. They also nd that some high-income countries such as the USA may lose from cooperation relative t o noncooperation, with the bulk of bene ts from cooperation accruing to developing countries. In their model, bargaining solutions are not examined and no interaction between trade and environment is considered.
A Two-Region North-South Trade and Environment Model
We consider a world consisting of two regions, which we refer to as`North' N and`South' S. Focusing on a two-region structure avoids the numerical complexities associated with computation of noncooperative equilibria in higher dimensions, and allows us to focus on two-player cooperative solution concepts. Computational limitations in working with noncooperative and cooperative game-theoretic solutions concepts rather than more traditional competitive equilibria thus severely restrict dimensionality in the numerical analysis.
We consider an environmental asset, E, which i s e n tirely owned by the South, and can beviewed as a stock re ecting available tropical habitat. Each region produces two goods, a tradeable goodX,anontradeable goodY. Region S uses two factors in production, value added V , and the natural resource asset. Production in region N only uses value added. Each region views tradeables produced domestically and abroad as imperfect substitutes, and consumes both domestic and imported traded goods, along with own region nontradeables. The environment available habitat is depleted by its use in production, and enters the utility function of each region.
Depletion occurs more heavily from use in production of the traded good. The endowment o f v alue added is constant in each region, and equal respectively to G N and G S .
Production
The structure of production in the model is set out in Figure 1 . CES functions are used, in which value added and the environmental asset can betransformed into an environment-using input at the lower level of nesting. Environmental Asset Value Added the environment-using input and value added are transformed into tradeable and nontradeable output. We use substitution elasticities of zero at the lower level, and of unity at the higher level. Value added used in the two levels of nest can be transformed at a constant marginal rate of transformation, which, for simplicity, w e assume to be equal to unity.
The rationale for using this construction is that if a single level production structure were speci ed with the environmental asset and value added as the only inputs, to preclude partial internalization of the externality through input substitution a zero elasticity w ould beneeded. However, with an unpriced input the environmental asset there would bein nite demand. The only mechanism for internalization in this case is through substitution between tradeables and non-tradeables via demand side e ects. With two levels of production substitution, taxes on an environment-using input can beintroduced, which will change the use of the environmental asset. The main di erence between the tradeable and non-tradeable goods sectors lies in the share parameters on the environment-using input.
Environmental Taxes
Net-of-tax prices for value added and the environment-using input are denoted respectively as p N and p S and are the same within each region. Each unit of environmentusing input employed in production in region S reduces global environmental quality by an amount . We consider taxes on the use of the environmental asset at rate S , and hence the gross-of-tax prices of the environment-using input in the two regions For given output levels L N X , L N Y , L S X , L S Y , we can write aggregate domestic demands for the environment-using input using Shephard's Lemma as
Environmental Quality
Environmental quality enters the preferences of both the North and the South, but with a substantially higher share parameter in the North than in the South, re ecting the di erential existence value placed on environmental assets by region. The quantity of environmental assets entering preferences as existence value equals the initial stock of assets less that amount used up in production through deforestation, for instance.
The period used for the model is a numberofyears or decades, during which signi cant depletion can occur depending upon the policy regime. For given demands for the environment-using input, environmental quality is then given as where the s are the Cobb-Douglas share parameters on environmental quality.
Policy Games in the Model
The model incorporates trade policy parameters in the form of tari s, and environmental policy parameters in the form of environmental charges. A traditional tari game can be analyzed as in Johnson, 1953-4 in which regions play strategically against one another in tari s. With the North being large and the South small, the presumption is that the North will gain from such a retaliatory game while the South will gain little, or more likely lose. There is also an environmental game that can be analyzed in terms of environmental charges associated with the use of the environmental asset. Since the South owns the environmental asset, and the North places a high existence value on the environmental asset, this gives the South a policy instrument to use jointly with trade policy in a linked trade and environment game which can lower Northern trade protection.
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In using the model, therefore, we go beyond conventional numerical simulation work which mainly focuses on Walrasian competitive equilibria, by computing noncooperative equilibria and bargaining outcomes. To do this, we iterate over calculations of optimal policy responses by individual regions, subject to a full set of general equilibrium constraints as set out above until convergence to a Nash equilibrium is achieved. We are able to do this separately for tari and environment policy games and for the linked trade and environment game. We also compute cooperative bargaining solutions associated with these games, adopting Nash's 1950 bargaining solution. This is the most widely used cooperative solution concept in the literature, although others, such as Kalai-Smorodinsky 1975 , could alternatively be used.
In computing bargaining solutions, we take the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium solution utilities as representing the disagreement point, simulate the utilities possibilities frontier under cooperation, and apply the Nash criterion to the product of the di erences in region utilities along the frontier and disagreement utilities.
In our central case, with trade or trade and environment games, no side payments are considered, and thus the resulting outcomes remain second best allocations. Typically in such equilibria there will be less than full internalization of the environmental externality. We also compute bargaining with side payments. This realizes a full Pareto optimal allocation, and allows us to assess how far towards Pareto optimality a joint trade and environment policy-based negotiation could move.
Alternatively, we could view cooperation as a subgame perfect equilibrium of an in nitely repeated game, supported by the threat of future punishment in response to unilateral deviations from a coordinated strategy trigger strategies. In this formulation we could explore whether a linked trade-environmental policy game makes cooperation in both areas easier to sustain in comparison with a scenario where the trade and environment dimensions of strategic interaction are examined in isolation from each other.
Data and Model Parameterization
We h a v e calibrated the model set out above to a 1990 base case projected forward over a period of 100 years. The economies of the North and the South are both assumed to lie on a growth path on which v alue added, production and consumption grow a t a constant rate, re ecting average growth rates over the period 1985-93. Data for this period implies rates of growth of 2.5 and 4 for the North and South respectively.
We assume a discount rate of 5.
The production and consumption and hence trade data we use are based on information taken from World Bank 1992, World Bank 1995, and IMF 1995. Nonenvironmental activities are disaggregated into two parts: traded and non-traded.
The non-traded goodssector contains all distribution, transportation, construction, utilities, and government services. This corresponds roughly to 68 and 47 of GDP for the North and South respectively.
In representing the regions, we include countries for the South which account for a signi cant portion of key global environmental assets, such as tropical forest and biological diversity. These countries are listed in Table 1 , and jointly control more than 80 of tropical forest and provide habitat for an unknown but presumed considerable proportion of species.
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The North we take to berepresented by OECD countries| who jointly re ect the environmental concern over depletion of environmental assets and would bethe lead players in any eventual trade and environment negotiation in the WTO|and the rest of the world. Table 2 reports the base year 1990 data on production by region and the corresponding 1990-2090 discounted data. Table 3 gives share and elasticity parameters.
In calibrating the model, we select a value of 2 for Armington substitution elasticities, a c hoice which is consistent with most model-based studies e.g., Perroni and Wigle, 1994 ; we subsequently vary this value for sensitivity analysis.
Parameters for the environmental portion of the model, are obtained as follows.
The environment-using input coe cients by region have been computed from inputoutput data for selected OECD countries. 6 We make the strong assumption that developing countries use the environment-using input in the two sectors in the same ratio as they are used in OECD countries. We consider the following sectors as providing environment-using inputs: agriculture, forestry and shing, mining and quarrying; petroleum and coal products; electricity, gas and water; and construction.
We compute the amount of base-case environmental damage, in terms of depletion of the endowment of the South's environmental asset, as follows. The endowment of the environmental assets in the South, relative to which depletion occurs, is set to be half of the North's GDP. The annual average depletion rate of tropical forests during the period 1981-90 was 0.6 World Resources Institute, 1994. Assuming constant depletion and a quadratic damage function, we obtain an estimate of physical damage for our period of analysis. We impute a valuation for this damage by using an annual OECD income growth of 2.5 over the period as well as an elasticity of marginal valuation of tropical forests with respect to income equal to 1.25 consistent with estimates obtained by Kramer et al., 1993 . We obtain a Northern present v alue of the Table 4 presents the basic data used for the environmental part of the model. In contrast, a linked trade and environment bargained outcome, where bargaining involves both trade and environmental policies, helps developing countries since they can use their leverage in environmental policy given the relatively high existence value in the North to help reduce Northern trade barriers against them.
Simulations and Results
These features emerge strongly from our central case set of model results summarized in Table 5 . Here we h a v e taken the central case model speci cation summarized above and computed non-cooperative Nash equilibria in tari s, bargained outcomes in trade tari s, and joint bargained outcomes covering both trade and environment policies. Trade elasticities are critical parameters in determining outcomes, and in this speci cation we have used values of 2 for both North and South. As is well known, as these values approach unity, in a symmetric case both regions optimal tari s would become large, and values signi cantly in excess of unity need to be used to avoid numerical problems. Because the asymmetries in size in our model can lead to large tari s and associated numerical problems, we use an upper bound of 500 for tari s in both regions in computing model solutions.
In the central case noncooperative equilibrium rst column of Table 5 the South's internalization rate is close to zero, consistent with most of the utility loss from lowered environmental quality being borne by the North. The North's trade barriers reach the upper bound of 500, while the South's noncooperative tari rate is around 100. This di erence in noncooperative tari levels re ects both di erences in country size and the fact that under zero environmental internalization in the South, the North employs tari s as a second-best environmental policy instrument. The South's loss from a trade war is close to 9 of GDP, whereas the North gains a little relative to a free-trade, zero-internalization scenario.
An environment-only negotiation not shown in the absence of lump-sum side payments, has negligible impacts because of the strongly asymmetric pattern of abate- ratio of emission tax to marginal emission damage ment costs and bene ts. Bargaining over trade policies in the absence of side payments column two of Table 5 With explicit bargaining and lump-sum side payments Table 6 , on the other hand, it is possible to achieve a rst-best outcome with zero tari s and 100 in- We have also performed sensitivity analysis of our central case results to the Armington elasticity v alues we use. These suggest that an increase in trade elasticities to a value of 3 Table 7 , which makes trade retaliation less damaging for the South, weakens opportunities for negotiation linkage. As a result, the maximum level of internalization that can beachieved through linkage is reduced. Results in Table 7 also show that, when linkage is weakened through higher trade elasticities, a linked Table 7 strengthens the potential for environment-trade policy negotiation linkages, and makes it possible to achieve a level of internalization close to 100 even in the absence of side payments. Table   8 has e ects qualitatively similar to those of reducing the assumed level of damage, with negotiation linkages remaining important, especially for the North.
Concluding Remarks
This paper addresses the issue of whether developing countries should participate in linked trade and environment negotiations in the WTO over the next few decades.
We develop a small dimensional global simulation model capturing both North-South trade, and Southern use of environmental assets in trade-related production when there is a high Northern existence value on such assets. We calibrate our model to data over a projected 100-year period from 1990 to 2090, in which Southern countries are identi ed as those accounting for 80 of tropical assets forest, species.
We compute various model solutions for alternative scenarios, principally noncooperative Nash equilibria for tari games which serve as threat points for cooperative bargaining again Nash solutions, and similar solutions for linked trade tari s and environmental taxes policy games.
In our central case analysis, linking trade and environmental policies in a joint negotiation expands the bargaining set and o ers Southern developing countries an opportunity to exert discipline over Northern trade measures by making environmental concessions. The South thus bene ts from a linked negotiation compared to a stand alone trade negotiation. However, in a negotiation with side payments, the South gains considerably more, suggesting developing countries should negotiate over cash for environmental restraint rather than indirectly on trade and environmental policy instruments. Sensitivity analysis suggests that as trade elasticities increase, and optimal stand alone tari s fall, the bene ts of linkage fall to the point that Southern countries bene t from being shielded from a trade and environment negotiation. Indeed, we report cases where linked negotiations can bedetrimental to the South, but this is not true in our central case.
While model results are suggestive, our model parameterization is heroic, and there are missing features, re ecting developing country concerns over trade and environment linkage, which are not captured here. Trade and environment linkage could become the precedent for further wider linkage in trade negotiations, should developing countries agree to participate trade and labour standard, for instance.
Agreeing to the use of trade measures on environmental grounds would weaken the MFN principle in GATT WTO, so central to developing country interests in the trading system. There is also ambiguity a s to whether a cohesive Southern coalition can really beformed to participate in such a negotiation. Furthermore, cooperation in the GATT-WTO may not re ect a bargained agreement which in the absence of a supranational authority would e ectively not beenforceable but rather a noncooperative equilibrium supported by implicit triggered retaliation threats, which the agreement only serves to ratify ex post. Under this interpretation, introducing an environmental dimension alongside trade negotiations may inject instability i n to the system, especially if policies are not observable Riezman, 1991 , and make retaliatory episodes more likely.
At the end of the day, h o w ever, the theme of our paper remains. Linked trade and environment negotiations in the WTO not only pose threats to developing country interests, they also create opportunities to improve trade disciplines over developed countries by trading o environmental concessions. These opportunities come with quali cation, but seem worth close examination by them.
